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A. A proposal that water rights be acquired under
state law to protect the instream habitat of
endangered fish in the Upper Colorado River
Basin has recently received much attention.
Recovery Implementation Program for Endangered
Fish Species in the upper Colorado River Basin,
Final Draft, January 9, 1987.
B. Such instream flow protection is sometimes not
a problem of retiring existing water uses and
improving instream flow regimes, but one in
which a choice must be made between the
existing instream flow regime and proposals for
the development of new water projects that
would deplete or dramatically alter existing
flows.
C. The same problem may be encountered with
proposals to designate wild & scenic rivers.
Since the passage of the Wild & Scenic River
Act in 1968, 35 river segments in Colorado have
been inventoried, 10 have been extensively
studied, but only one has been designated, the
Cache La Poudre, last year.
D. In Colorado the plans for proposed water
projects are embodied in a form of real
property: conditional water rights. This
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suggests a strategy in which the choice between
new water projects and the protection of
instream flows could sometimes be resolved
through the acquisition of conditional water
rights in the marketplace, and through the
change of those water rights to instream flow
protection. An analogous strategy may be
possible in other western states depending on
their approach to conditional water rights.
II. What Are Conditional Water Rights?
A.	 The Colorado law of conditional water rights is
thoroughly reviewed by Hallford in Development
of Conditional Water Rights Law, The Colorado
Lawyer, 353-362 (March 1985). This article is
attached to this outline with the permission of
The Colorado Lawyer, as Appendix A.
1. A conditional water right is a "right to
perfect a water right with a certain
priority upon completion with reasonable
diligence of the appropriation upon which
such water right is to be based." C.R.S.
Section 37-92-103(6).
2. Thus when there is some time between the
first step of a plan to put water to use
and the completion of that plan, the
priority of the appropriation or water
2
right "relates back" to the first step.
"The doctrine offers the security of
priority needed to plan and finance major
water projects, particularly long range
municipal and industrial water plans."
Hallford, Conditional Water Rights at 353.
See Metropolitan Suburban Water Users v. 
Colorado River Water Conservation District,
365 P2d 273, 285 (Colo. 1961).
3. Conditional water rights might be viewed as
a kind of private system of water
development planning, with the earliest
plan, as tested against the standards of a
bona fide plan of beneficial water use and
diligent progress toward such use, being
sanctioned by the state. In terms of the
most economic, efficient, or optimal public
allocation of water, the first proposed
plan may not be the best one. But it may
nevertheless enjoy the doctrine of relation
back, and since the plan also constitutes
transferable property, the problem of a
less than optimal allocation can be
addressed in a private market transaction.
In effect, one test of whether a later plan
is clearly better is whether it can buy out
the earlier.
4. The doctrine of relation back, however,
stands in contrast to the Colorado
constitutional doctrine of appropriation of
water rights because it recognizes a water
right before satisfaction of the
fundamental requirement of actually putting
water to beneficial use. Hallford points
out the tension between the need to
recognize conditional water rights for
costly, long range water projects and the
need to guard against speculation and
hoarding undeveloped water rights.
Hallford, Conditional Water Rights at 353.
Much of the Hallford article concerns a
recent trend in Colorado to strictly apply
the law of conditional water rights, and
perhaps to weed out some of the less viable
water projects in favor of better ones.
See especially C.R.S. Sections 37-92-
103(3)(a) and 305 (9)(b); Trans-County 
Water, Inc. v. Central Colorado Water 
Conservancy District, 727 P2d 60 (Colo.
1986); Denver v. Colorado River Water 
Conservation District, 696 P2d 730 (Colo.
1985); Southeastern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District v. City of Florence,
688 P2d 715 (Colo. 1984); Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. Denver, 640
P2d 1139 (Colo. 1982); Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel 
Water Co., 594 P2d 566 (Colo. 1979).
B.	 At first blush, one might think that the
Colorado Water Courts were edging toward water
development planning and toward deciding which
proposed water projects are the most efficient
and economical.
1. In Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. Denver and Trans-County Water,
the Colorado Supreme Court talked about the
diligence issue in terms of whether
continuing the subject conditional water
rights was the "most" beneficial use of
water. 640 P2d at 1142; 727 P2d at 65. In
both cases, the Court also suggested that
the standard for diligence may be higher
where competing water developers could show
that continuation of a more senior
conditional water right frustrated their
legitimate water needs. 640 P2d at 1141;
727 P2d at 65.
2. A recent ruling by the Division No. 5 Water
5
Court in Case No. 84 CW 70 holds that the
doctrine of res judicata does not bar the
reexamination of the plan or intent to put
water to beneficial use in a diligence
proceeding, and that the arguably tougher
standards articulated in Vidler and City of 
Florence for establishing a new conditional
water right could be considered in deciding
whether a previously decreed one should be
continued. This ruling is attached as
Appendix B.
C. Some may think that this trend offers a
strategy for incorporating the protection of
existing flow regimes into water development
planning. That strategy would be to resist the
award of new conditional water rights, as the
National Wildlife Federation (NWF) is seeking
to do with Aurora's Collegiate Range Project,
or to police diligence filings, as the Denver
Water Board or Colorado River Water
Conservation District sometimes do, arguing in
both instances for application of the new and
tougher standards against speculation.
D. But unlike traditional diligence contests
between competing conditional water rights
holders, NWF may only seek to protect existing
6
flows rather than a competing reservoir or
collection system. If NWF has no standing to
protect instream flows because that job has
been delegated exclusively to the Colorado
Water Conservation Board (CWCB), then the new
standards against speculation would offer
little comfort to NWF. Moreover as the Denver
Water Board, the River District, and many
others have learned, it requires a tremendous
commitment of resources to monitor, let alone
prevail, in continual conditional water right
proceedings.
E.	 More importantly, the Colorado Water Courts are
not about to take on the job of water
development planning.
1. While the Colorado Supreme Court talked
about the most beneficial and efficient use
of water and about the needs of competing
water users, the Court upheld the
cancellation of the conditional water right
in Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. Denver not because it was shown
to be less efficient or economical than
competing projects, but because nothing
specific had been done to further the
original project. General litigation and
lobbying to promote water development did
not constitute diligence on a particular
project. 640 P2d at 1142. But the
conditional water right would have been
continued had its owner applied project
specific effort even though it may not have
been the best project, and the Court
declined to inject itself into water
development planning.
2. The Court went no further in Trans County
Water than to confirm that some very
stringent diligence criteria concerning
project feasibility and financing which had
been included in the decree awarding a
conditional water right could be considered
in deciding whether the right was being
diligently developed. 727 P2d at 65-66.
The Court observed that the water right
owner had acquiesced in the incorporation
of the stringent criteria into the original
decree and permitted the owner to be held
to this somewhat self imposed diligence
standard, but again the Court did not
attempt its own water development planning.
3. The Division No. 5 ruling in Case No. 84 CW
70 also probably does not go that far. The
original water development plan may be
subject to reexamination and the Vidler and
City of Florence standards considered in a
diligence case, but this may only mean a
more rigorous review of the progress on the
original plan, and not a wholesale planning
exercise in which the economics and
efficiency of the plan are weighed against
all others.
4. In Metropolitan Suburban Water Users, the
Colorado Supreme Court said:
"The trial court had no right to
substitute its opinion as to the course
of future events, for that of those
charged with the duty of supplying
adequate water for municipalities and
other public bodies, who have made
careful studies of the questions and
problems presented and have in good
faith put their vision, work, money and
energies into a program by which they
seek to put the public waters of the
state to beneficial use. If they have
miscalculated and fail, the loss is
theirs-if they succeed, it will be for
the eternal benefit of the peoples of
the State of Colorado."
365 P2d at 288. Whether one agrees with
the Court's rhetoric on the public benefit
of water development, the statement stands
as an expression of current law.
F. Under prevailing Colorado law, the acquisition
of conditional water rights in the marketplace
for change to instream flow protection may be
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the only realistic alternative in some
situations for an instream flow protection
strategy; diligence litigation does not offer a
satisfactory forum for water development
planning.
III. A Theory for a Conditional Water Rights Market in
Colorado
A. Conditional water rights are vested property
rights under Colorado law. C.R.S. Section 37-
92-305(3); Mooney v. Kuiper, 573 P2d 538, 539
(Colo. 1978); Rocky Mountain Power Company v. 
White River Electric Association. 376 P2d 158,
162 (Colo. 1962).
B. Conditional water rights are also changeable
property rights.
1. The change of the proposed point of
diversion or use of a conditional water
right poses a fundamental policy question.
a. The continuation of a "fixed and
definite purpose" to carry out the
original intent or plan for beneficial
water use is an accepted diligence
standard. Denver v. Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, 276 P2d
992, 999 (Colo. 1954). But a change in
a conditional water right may imply a
10
discontinuation of the original plan
and a shift to a new one.
b. A conditional water right that was
infeasible at its original point of
diversion might be feasible at another.
If a change of a conditional water
right to a new point of diversion is
not permitted, then the original water
project could fail and never burden the
stream. But if a change is permitted,
the project could get new life and
require all others to account for its
potential draft on the stream at the
new point of diversion.
2. This policy question has been resolved by
the Colorado General Assembly in favor of
permitting changes of conditional water
rights.
a. Conditional water rights include the
same right to change the right as other
water rights.	 C.R.S. Section 37-92-
103(5); Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal 
Co. v. Aspen, 568 P2d 45 (Colo. 1977);
Judgement and Decree in Case No. 2686,
Water Division No. 5 at 10 (George E.
Lohr, Water Judge). An excerpt from
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this Judgement and Decree is attached
as Appendix C. If there is no injury
to other water rights, the change
"shall be approved." C.R.S. Sections
37-92-305(3).
b. These statutes codify the case law that
one incident of a water right as
private property is the right to change
its point of diversion or use so long
as no other water rights are injured.
Wiebert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P2d
1367 (Colo. 1980).
3. But while changes of conditional water
rights are clearly authorized by statute,
the inquiry as to whether such changes will
cause injury requires special attention.
a. With absolute water rights where water
has been diverted and used over a
period of time, the injury question
posed by changing such water rights is
usually framed in terms of historic
consumptive use. Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Fort Lyon
Canal Company, 720 P2d 133 (Colo.
1986). Wiebert v. Rothe Bros, Inc. 
b. Even though more water could have been
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diverted over time under a particular
absolute water right, the amount that
can be used under the changed water
right is limited by the amount actually
diverted under the original right so
that the amount of water left in the
stream and the supply to other water
rights is not diminished by the change.
c. Often much of what is diverted returns
to the stream unconsumed, and only that
which was historically consumed can be
consumptively used under the changed
water right, again so that the supply
to others is not affected.
4. A hypothetical standard to prevent injury
is required for changes of conditional
water rights since, definitionally, water
has not yet been put to use.
a. The "contemplated draft" standard for
changing conditional water rights was
reviewed in Twin Lakes.
1) Several municipalities sought to
change the conditional decrees for
the Independence Pass Transmountain
Diversion System from irrigation to
municipal use, but without changing
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the season of use or the points of
diversion from the Roaring Fork
River Basin.
2) In determining whether the change
of the conditional water rights
from irrigation to municipal use
would adversely affect the supply
remaining in the Roaring Fork Basin
the Division No. 5 Water Court
examined how much water would have 
been diverted across the
continental divide for irrigation
use had the conditional decrees
been perfected for that use, found
that the maximum amount that would
be diverted for municipal use was
no greater, and concluded that the
Roaring Fork River Basin suffered
no injury. The Colorado Supreme
Court endorsed this analysis. 568
P2d at 49-50.
b. Hallford argues that where the timing
of diversions or more importantly the
amount and timing of return flows are
implicated, "contemplated consumption"
should be the standard for determining
14
whether a change of conditional water
rights is injurious. Hallford,
Conditional Water Rights at 358. Such
a standard is not inconsistent with
Twin Lakes because the contemplated
transmountain diversions for irrigation
use would have been just as consumptive
to the Roaring Fork River Basin as
transmountain diversion for municipal
use-both would have been 100%
consumptive.
c. The "contemplated draft" standard was
also applied by the Division No. 5
Water Court in Case No. W-2686
involving the change of conditional
water rights for the Rocky Mountain
Power Company's (ROMPOCO) hydropower
project. See Appendix C. Like the
Independence Pass Transmountain
Diversion System in Twin Lakes, this
project proposed to divert water out of
the White River Basin into the Colorado
River Basin, without any return flow to
the basin of origin.
1) In 1975, one of the principal
proposed points of diversion for
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the ROMPOCO project and part of one
reservoir site were included in the
Flattops Wilderness Area.
The wilderness designation greatly
reduced the feasibility of
developing the ROMPOCO project as
originally proposed and decreed.
An unprecedented exemption from the
President was now required to
develop the project and the
prospects for securing federal land
use permits became quite dim.
2) The conditional water rights were
nonetheless purchased by an oil
shale company who sought to change
their points of diversion from the
wilderness headwaters to a pumping
pipeline 87 miles downstream near
the energy rich Piceance Basin.
3) This change of water rights was
resisted on the grounds that the
contemplated draft of the ROMPOCO
project was effectively reduced to
zero by the wilderness designation
and that the requested change of
water rights was so fundamental
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that it amounted to an abandonment
of the original project.
4) The Water Court noted that in the
case of conditional water rights,
the amount to be diverted at the
original point of diversion was
inherently uncertain. Because of
design changes or permitting
requirements, a constructed water
project may divert less than the
conditionally decreed amount, and
it is possible that a project will
never be built at all. The Water
Court found, however, that this
inherent uncertainty did not
preclude the change altogether or a
showing of non-injury. Judgement
and Decree in Case No. 2686 at 16-
19.
5) Citing Twin Lakes and further
noting that the permitting
requirements that would have
limited diversions by the original
project would not apply at the new
point of diversion far downstream,
the Court concluded that the
17
contemplated draft of the
conditional water rights was the
full amount of water divertable in




requirements faced by the original
project. Judgement and Decree in
Case No. 2686 at 17-19, 22-23.
6) The Court characterized the
increased supply that would have
become available to juniors in the
White River Basin had the
contemplated draft been limited by
permit conditions as a windfall on
which juniors were not entitled to
rely. Such juniors were
accordingly not injured by the
exercise of the ROMPOCO priority at
the new point of diversion to call
the full amount divertable by the
original project, less transit
losses. Judgement and Decree in
Case No. 2686 at 22-23.
d. Two important qualifications: The same
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analysis might not apply where the
diversions under the original project
were not 100% consumptive to the basin
of origin and where return flow has to
be considered or where the point of
diversion for a conditional water right
is moved upstream, above some of the
originally decreed sources of supply.
e. One important implication of the
ROMPOCO case: If a land use
designation or federal permitting
requirement calls the feasibility of a
proposed water project into question,
the hypothetical yield of conditional
water rights may still be enjoyed to
the extent that the water rights can be
developed elsewhere without injuring
other water rights.
D.	 A limited market in conditional water rights
has developed in Colorado around these
principles. Besides the Twin Lakes and ROMPOCO
sales:
1. The conditional water rights for the Four
Counties and Bear Reservoir projects in the
headwaters of the Yampa River Basin were
acquired by the Colorado ate Electric
19
Association, which in turn obtained change
of water rights decrees and sold them to
the upper Yampa River Water Conservancy
District for use in development of the
Stagecoach Reservoir.
2. Small portions of the conditional water
rights for the Juniper-Cross Mountain
project in the lower Yampa River Basin have
also been acquired by Colorado Ute and
changed to alternate points of storage
upstream.
3. Very small pieces of the conditional water
rights for the Basalt and West Divide
projects have been carved off and marketed
for use in augmentation plans for
residential developments in the lower
Roaring Fork Valley and the Rifle-DeBeque
corridor.
4. As part of a land exchange, the U.S.
acquired a number of conditional water
rights on Castle Creek near Ashcroft, and
then obtained state water court decrees
changing them to instream uses and making
them absolute. Case Nos. 84 CW 180, 181, 
182, 183, 184 and 185, Water Division
No. 5.
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E.	 The appraisal of the value of conditional water
rights for the market may present some
difficult questions:
1. What is the highest and best use of a
conditional water right, and how should the
feasibility and permit requirements of the
originally decreed project be considered?
2. Is there another point of diversion where
the conditional water right can be
developed or can it be developed for new
use if it is not feasible to develop the
right as originally decreed, and what is
the market value at the new point or of the
new use?
3. Will the yield of a conditional water right
at a new point of diversion or for a new
use be any greater than the yield of a new
and consequently the most junior
appropriation on the stream?
4. What development and operating costs must
be incurred to realize the value of the
water right as originally decreed, at the
new point of diversion, or for a new use,
and what interest and other financial
assumptions should be made in estimating
any such costs?
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5. If the market value of the original or
changed conditional use is based on a
comparison to the market value of developed
water supplies for the same use, should the
costs that must be incurred to develop the
right be deducted from the comparable
value?
6. Is there intrinsic value in the original
location of conditional water rights even
though they will be developed elsewhere?
7. See Ross, Valuation of Water Rights for 
Acquisition, Condemnation, and Taxation 
Purposes, 18 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute 563-593 (1973).
IV. Changing Conditional Water Rights to Instream Flow
Protection
A. Once the questions of contemplated draft and
market value are resolved, the change of
conditional water rights to instream flow
protection can be straightforward.
B. In Colorado, the statutory requirement of
diversion from the stream as an element of a
water right has been repealed, and the CWCB has
been authorized, perhaps exclusively, to
appropriate or acquire water rights for
instream flow protection. C.R.S. Sections 37-
22
92-102(3) and 103(4).
1. The CWCB may acquire conditional water
rights, change their use to instream flow
protection in state water court, and
exercise the acquired priority to protect
instream flows, provided the contemplated
draft standard is met and no other water
rights are injured.
2. A private party that was interested in
protecting instream flows could also
acquire conditional water rights and then
convey them to the CWCB for change to
instream flow protection.
a. The CWCB has already entered such
contracts with the City of Aspen and
The Nature Conservancy who turned over
absolute irrigation and municipal water
rights for change to instream flow
protection.
1) The City of Aspen simply licensed
some of its Hunter Creek water
rights to the CWCB and joined the
CWCB as a co-applicant in the
change of water rights proceeding.
2) The Nature Conservancy purchased
the Berkeley Ditch water right on
23
Boulder Creek subject to its
successful change to instream flow
protection with the CWCB as a co-
applicant, and then conveyed the
water right to the CWCB on the
condition that the water right
would revert to The Nature
Conservancy if the CWCB did not use
it for instream flow protection.
b. An amendment to Colorado's instream
flow statue was introduced this year
(S.B. 212) which suggests that the
CWCB's authority to exercise and defend
water rights acquired for and changed
to instream flow protection may be
enforced under the contract by which
the CWCB acquired the water right.
C.	 The U.S. is also able to acquire and change
water rights to instream flow protection.
1. In the Castle Creek cases mentioned above,
the U.S. brandished its Property and
Supremacy powers and obtained decrees from
the Division No. 5 Water Court changing
conditional water rights to instream flow
protection without licensing or conveying
any interest in the water rights to the
24
CWCB and without the CWcB joining in the
water court proceeding.
2. The U.S. is currently seeking to change a
number of water rights acquired in the
expansion of Rocky Mountain National Park
to instream flow protection and other uses,
again without the support of the CWCB.
3. This year's proposed amendment to
Colorado's instream flow statue (S.B. 212)
would recognize this federal prerogative to
change acquired water rights to instream
uses in state water court without the CWCB.
D. Such prerogatives of the CWCB or the U.S.,
however, may not satisfy a private party who
feels unable to persuade either the CWCB or the
U.S. to exercise and defend instream flow water
rights with the same zeal that he or she would
like. This year's proposed amendment to
Colorado's instream flow (S.B. 212) statute
would expressly preclude any private right of
appropriation for instream flow protection,
while it would authorize limited review of the
CWCB actions to prevent injury to the instream
flow water rights which it holds.
E. In expressly precluding any private right of
appropriation for instream flow protection, the
25
proposed amendment does not make it impossible
for a private party like The Nature Conservancy
to effectively act as a real estate agent for
the CWCB or the U.S. The Conservancy could
explore the market and obtain options fixing
price and the seller's willingness, and then
assign the option to the CWCB or the U.S. which
could take title and change the water right to
instream flow protection. The Conservancy
could also help the CWCB or the U.S. raise
money to exercise the option. The Conservancy
could even hold the acquired water rights on a
short term basis for later conveyance to the
CWCB or the U.S. In such a case, the
Conservancy would not be acting much
differently than a private water broker who
purchased agricultural water rights for resale
to a municipality and who lacked the legal
capacity to put the acquired water rights to
municipal use. The Conservancy would of course
not seek to profit on resale, and would only be
interested in protecting instream habitat. But
the temporary acquisition of a water right by
the Conservancy with the intent to convey it to
the CWCB or the U.S. for change to instream
flow protection would not automatically
26
extinguish the acquired water right under the
proposed amendment. The Conservancy would only
risk abandonment of the acquired water right if
the Conservancy was unable to convey the water
right to the CWCB or the U.S. or otherwise put
it to beneficial use after a reasonable period
of time.
V. An Example: The Acquisition and Change of
Conditional Water Rights to Protect Instream Flows
in the Black Canyon and Gunnison Gorge.
A.	 The Gunnison River as it flows through the
Gunnison Gorge just below the Black Canyon is a
remarkable instream flow resource of national
significance.
1. The Gunnison Gorge Reach is a Wild
Trout/Gold Medal trout fishery, was once a
home to the river otter, a Colorado
endangered species, is important wintering
habitat for the bald eagle, and is becoming
a popular rafting run.
2. The Gorge is accessible only by foot or
horseback and is soon expected to be
recommended for wilderness designation by
the BLM.
3. In 1986, federal legislation was introduced
to designate 29 miles of the Gunnison
27
River, including all of the Gunnison Gorge,
as a national wild & scenic river, and to
change the status of the Black Canyon of
the Gunnison National Monument to a
national park.
B. There are also overlapping plans to develop
some major water projects in the Gorge, each
with decreed conditional water rights in good
standing. The largest of the proposed
projects, that proposed by the Pittsburg and
Midway Coal Company, includes a dam and
reservoir that would back water up to the
boundary of the National Monument and
completely inundate the Gorge.
C. The best strategy for resolving this conflict
between the development of dams and the
protection of instream flows probably does not
include litigating the viability of the
conditional water rights, but might include the
acquisition and conversion of these water
rights to instream flow protection.
1. Pittsburg and Midway has agreed to donate
300 cfs out of its conditional water rights
in the Gorge to The Nature Conservancy and
has promised in the same agreement not to
develop its remaining conditional water
28
rights within a 26 mile reach of the
Gunnison River which includes most of the
Gorge. The Nature Conservancy plans to
offer the donated water right to the CWCB
for change to instream flow protection.
2. The holders of the other major conditional
water rights in the Gorge have signaled
their interest in essentially trading their
rights for developed storage supplies
upstream at Blue Mesa Reservoir.
VI. Conclusion
A. Under the law of conditional water rights in
Colorado, private initiative is an important
vehicle for water development planning. Such
private initiative has conventionally been
tested in lawsuits over whether a conditional
water right for a project should be granted and
continued. There may be little room to
incorporate instream flow protection into such
a lawsuits.
B. But because water development plans in the form
of conditional water rights are transferable
property, and since conditional water rights
can be changed to instream flow protection so
long as other water rights are not injured,
stalemates over the protection of instream
29
flows in Colorado might be resolved through
market transactions based on the property
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Unappropriated water has become
increasingly scarce in parts of Colorado
and, as a result, decreed conditional
water rights have become significant
considerations for water supply devel-
opers. As Colorado water use continues
to change from agricultural and mining
to municipal, industrial and other uses,
water use relationships are being
refined and adjusted. Currently, chang-
ing economic conditions have affected
the viability of some decreed condition-
al projects, making it desirable to alter
some projects either to serve different
ends or to accomplish original goals dif-
ferently. Also, several large conditional
projects involve the same water supply,
casting doubt on the feasibility of the
more junior projects.
The need for greater certainty in wa-
ter planning, the intensifying competi-
tion for and protection of supplies, and
the desirability of altering some proj-
ects have spurred developments in con-
ditional rights law. The parameters of
the legal framework are being defined
in the courts and the General As-
sembly. During the past few years,
changes have been and are continu-
ing to be made in the requirements for
initiating and establishing diligence in
developing conditional rights; and in
the standards for changing and perfect-
ing conditional rights. , These develop-
ments have importance beyond water
law. They are relevant in real estate,
property development and municipal
law practice since they will affect the
activities and decisions of property
owners and developers, as well as those
of private and public water suppliers.
BACKGROUND
A conditional water right is an in-
choate right to use water that has been
initiated for a project that has not been
completed. It is defined by statute as
a right to perfect a water right with a
certain priority upon the completion
with reasonable diligence of the ap-
propriation upon which such water
right is to be based.'
Conditional water rights were first
recognized in the development of the
doctrine of "relation back." This pro-
vides that if adequate intention is
formed and actions are taken to initiate
a water project, its priority date under
the appropriation system may "relate
back" to the date of those acts if the
project is completed diligently. ° The
doctrine offers the security of priority
needed to plan and finance major water
projects, particularly long-range muni-
cipal and industrial water plans. The
doctnne is in derogation of the Colora-
do Constitution. and it is strictly con-
strued and applied.4
Two major policy goals must be ad-
dressed in the development of condi-
tional rights law: (1) the certainty of pri-
ority, needed to justify development of
costly and long-range projects; and (2)
the desirability of maximum use of
Colorado's water and the concomitant
prevention of hoarding of undeveloped
rights. Both goals require flexibility in
standards for developing and changing
conditional projects, as well as the es-
tablishment of firm requirements so
that speculative appropriations are de-
nied or cancelled. These two considera-
tions are not mutually exclusive, but at
times can conflict.
Striking and maintaining a balance
between these two policies is helpful.
Maximum utilization depends ulti-
mately on certainty of priority since
large water projects probably cannot be
financed and developed without it. In
contrast. certainty of priority does not
David C. Hanford, Denver, is an associate
of the firm of Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw
Hawing.
depend on the realization of maximum
use because it focuses on individual wa-
ter rights. An emphasis on fostering Cer-
tainty of priority, however, would im-
pede maximum use due to the chilling
effects of perpetuating conditional de-
crees without actual development ef-
forts. Certainty of priority is a tool




To initiate a conditional water right,
an intent to divert and use specific wa-
ters must be formed, and overt actions
must be taken to give notice of the in-
tent to third parties. The intent and ac-
tion requirements are "distinct and sep-
arate" elements, and the priority date of
a conditional right is the date on which
both elements are satisfied and "coex-
ist"' The adequacy of both intent and
action is a factual matter. The water
court's findings are binding if sup-
ported by competent evidence.° The in-
tent and action "prongs" of initiation
are of equal concern to an appropriator,
and several significant recent develop-
ments concerning the requirements for
each should be considered carefully.
The Intention Prong
Initiation of an appropriation, condi-
tional or absolute, requires "an intent
to appropriate a definite quantity of
water for beneficial use.... 7 Analyti-
cally, intent appears to have two ele-
ments: intent to divert water and intent
to use water. These elements often
overlap.
Intent to Use Versus Speculation:
In the 1970s, what is known as the
"speculation" doctrine was applied
APPENDIX A
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with increasing strictness. In brief, this
doctrine provides that requisite intent
to obtain a conditional decree does not
exist when an applicant seeks such a
decree for unspecified uses of water or
to supply water to third parties with
whom the applicant is neither in con-
tractual privity nor an agent or govern-
mental agency. The applicant who falls
within any of these categories is consid-
ered a speculator, and the court would
deny a conditional decree.
The problem of distinguishing be-
tween bona fide intent and speculation
is not new. , Recent developments,
however, are that (I) there is increas-
ingly frequent application of the
speculation doctrine; (2) the Colorado
Supreme Court and General Assembly
have refined factual indicia of specula-
tion: and (3) the doctrine has been ap-
plied to public, as well as private, water
suppliers.
In Bunger v. Uncompaghre Valley
Water Users .4ssoc., the court upheld
the denial of a conditional decree based
on the following evidence of lack of
requisite intent: the applicant had no
plans for constructing or financing the
project; the applicant's eventual water
uses were unspecified; and the appli-
cant had not calculated the amount of
water to be appropriated.9
After Bunger, a four-judge majority
directed the entry of a conditional de-
cree in Twin Lakes Reservoir and
Canal Co. v. City of Aspen.'" The cen-
tral issue was whether the construction
of a canal many years before Twin
Lakes formed the intent to divert and
use more water demonstrated adequate
intent. The majority reasoned that the
"action" prong of initiation may be sat-
isfied before the formation of specific
intent and may coexist with a subse-
quent decision to divert water. A three-
judge minority urged denial of the de-
cree because, although most water users
in an arid region have an obvious de-
sire to acquire all possible water, such
an "open-ended" intention focuses on
neither specific waters nor specific
uses."
The minority's reasoning proved to
be a precursor for the decision in Colo-
rado River Water Conservation District
v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. 12 That deci-
sion applied the speculation doctrine
and reversed an award of conditional
rights. The applicant had developed
plans for a large storage project and had
granted the City of Golden an option to
purchase a small amount of the water.
The court held that the applicant had
not formed an intent to use water, dit
tinguishing between mere "speculation"
and the constitutionally guaranteed
right to appropriate for beneficial use.
The court specifically held that recog-
nizing conditional appropriations by
those who will not use the water per-
sonally and who do not act as agents for
or have contractual relationships with
the ultimate water users would promote
monopolization of the resource by
profiteers and chill the developmental
efforts of bona fide water users. The
court reversed the water court's decree
except for the amount granted to the
City of Golden."
Even as Vidler was being decided, the
General Assembly modified the statu-
tory definition of "appropriation" to
require that a prospective appropriator
must be the ultimate water user, or the
municipal agency for the ultimate
users, or must have an agency or con-
tractual relationship with the ultimate
users.14 The ['idler definition of spec-
ulation was thereby codified by the
General Assembly.
Three years later, in Rocky Mountain
Power Co. r. Colorado River Water
Conservation District, the court upheld
the denial of a conditional claim for
water proposed to be sold by the appli-
cant to unidentified municipalities. Sig-
nificantly, the court held that Vidler
was an affirmation, not a reversal or
modification, of prior law." Lionelle v.
Southeastern Colorado Water Conser-
vancy District, decided in 1984, contin-
ued the consistent application of the
speculation doctrine, bolsterefbrthe
statutory modification.I6
The applications and refinements of
the speculation doctrine from Vidler
through Lionelle involved private ap-
plicants. In the recent decision in Den-
ver v. Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District," the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed the issue of a munici-
pality's capacity to appropriate waters
conditionally to supply suburban users
who are not residents of the municipali-
ty. The court made two significant
holdings concerning intent to appropri-
ate, brought Fidler almost full circle,
and raised new questions to be ad-
dressed by the water courts.
The court first held that a resolution
of the Denver Board of Water Commis-
sioners broadly directing the appropria-
tion of all possible raw water out of
the Colorado River. and its tributaries"
was insufficient to evidence the re-
quired fixed intention to appropriate
specific waters. This holding follows the
dissenting view in Twin Lakes. dis-
cussed above, that a general desire for
additional water is legally inadequate.
Nevertheless, the court held that the
subsequent refinement of the Board's
general desire by authorized staff
who prepared detailed maps of diver-
sion points and estimated diversion
amounts from specific streams consti-
tuted formation of the required intent,
even though the Board never specifical-
ly approved that subsequent work."
The court's second significant hold-
ing applied the Fidler requirements to
Denver's conditional claims, which
were predicated upon proposed service
to water suppliers outside of Denver's
boundaries. The court rejected an argu-
ment that Denver lacked legal capacity
to appropriate waters for such suburban
service, but recognized that, in im-
plementing such service, municipalities
act in a proprietary capacity and are
subject to regulation by the General As-
sembly."
In determining the need for and
scope of Denver's appropriations for
such purposes, the court held that
Vidler is controlling as "an application
of long-standing principles." The court
directed that the water judge determine
on remand the extent of Denver's agen-
cy and contractual obligations to subur-
ban suppliers on the dates of initiation
of the several appropriations.?"
In summary, the Fidler court's analy-
sis of the speculation doctrine has been
recognized as a long-standing legal re-
quirement and has been codified and
applied to claims of both private and
public water developers. Therefore,
prospective appropriators must meet
one of the following four tests to dem-
onstrate necessary intent to appropriate
water the applicant must be (I) the ul-
timate user, (2) the municipal agency of
such users, (3) the agent of such users or
(4) the contract supplier for such users:
Intent to Divert
Unappropriated Water:
Colorado law now requires that an
appropriator of conditional rights dem-
onstrate an ability to divert or store
unappropriated water. While an award
of conditional groundwater rights clear-
ly depends on availability of unap-
propriated water, 21 traditionally it was
not necessary to show that unap-
propriated water was or would be avail-
able to obtain a conditional decree for
surface waters." In 1979. however, leg-
islation was enacted requiring that a
conditional right cannot be decreed un-
Th
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Pa% less the waters claimed "can and will
be" captured and beneficially used
within a reasonable period of time),
This statute has been interpreted to re-
quire proof that unappropriated water
will be available under a conditional
water right within a reasonable time.
Lionelle, noted above, presented an
opportunity for review of this new stat-
ute." In that case, the Colorado Su-
preme Court upheld the denial of a con-
ditional decree. The court's affirmation
of the denial focused on injury rather
than unavailability of unappropriated
water. Injury can occur to vested rights
if water is taken out of priority, but, in
adjudicating a conditional right, the
case law and statutes" indicate that the
precise criterion for the award of a right
is availability of unappropriated water,
not injury. The Lionelle result was con-
sistent with a strict interpretation of the
new statutory requirement, although it
did not apply it expressly, causing some
uncertainty.
Southeastern Colorado Water Con-
servancy District v. City of Florence
clarified the ambiguity created by Lion-
elle and expressly applied the new stat-
ute on conditional decrees." This appli-
cant applied for a surface water right
that would be in priority very infre-
quently. The court rejected an "injury"
attack on the application. Based on the
new statutory requirement, the court
held that the applicant had not proven
availability of unappropriated water."
The court's remand, however, directed
reconsideration under both the statu-
tory criteria and the possible injury to
senior appropriators."
In summary, the recent legislation as
interpreted by the courts requires that
adequate proof of availability of unap-
propriated water must support a condi-
tional decree in the absence of a plan
for augmentation." This rule is consis-
tent with a strict interpretation of the
speculation doctrine.
Standards for initiating conditional
rights and for diligence in developing
such rights are related. The existence of
conditional decrees could prevent pro-
spective appropriators from showing
that "unappropriated" water will be
available for their capture and use. For
example, City of Florence involved the
heavily over-appropriated Arkansas
River basin. Therefore, the Colorado
Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether decreed conditional rights
must be considered in determining
whether unappropriated water will be
available to a new conditional right. If
such rights must be considered. further
tightening of diligence standards even-
tually may be warranted. Otherwise.
the perpetuation of decreed conditional
rights with minimal development effort
could strangle the plans of those pre-
pared to develop but who cannot be-
cause they lack "unappropriated" water
and are denied decrees. It may be more
logical for the courts not to consider
decreed conditional rights in assessing
available water for new conditional
projects, because such rights are not
completed appropriations.
The Action Prong
"[I]ntention alone has never consti-
tuted an appropriation?"0 Initiating an
appropriation requires both intent and
overt physical acts sufficient to give no-
tice to third parties." An often -cited
test for the required overt acts requires
"open and notorious" physical activity
which demonstrates a fixed purpose to
divert and use water. The primary pur-
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others "of the proposed use and conse-
quent demand upon the water supply
involved."
The overt action requirement has
been applied with varying degrees of
strictness. In 1961, the Colorado Su-
preme Court directed the issuance of a
conditional decree where uncontra-
dieted factual findings showed that no
survey had been made of a project." In
—Contrast, the 1976 Hunger court found
that preliminary survey work was done
"merely to fulfill appellant's mistaken
concept of the statutory requirement,"
and was inadequate." Thus, the ade-
quacy of particular overt actions to ini-
tiate a conditional right had been ana-
lyzed differently by the court, creating
some ambiguity.
Fortunately, two recent Colorado Su-
preme Court decisions clarify the na-
ture of oven actions required to initiate
a conditional right. In City of Aspen v.
Colorado River Water Conservation
District, the court held expressly that
work "on the land" is not an absolute
prerequisite to initiating a conditional
water right." The court carefully
reviewed its prior decisions and con-
cluded that prior statements which
seemed to require that work be per-
formed "on the land" did not really re-
quire this for disposition of the particu-
lar cases. The court remanded the case
for determination as to the adequacy of
the applicant's actions to (1) "manifest
the necessary intent," (2) demonstrate
that a "substantial step" had been taken
or (3) "constitute proper notice."
Thus, this case established three quali-
ties which must comprise adequate
physical action.
Denver v. Colorado River Water Con-
servation District also considered the
adequacy of overt actions?' In deter-
mining whether Denver had initiated
several appropriations, the court cited
the City of Aspen clarification of the
"on the land" question. It also focused
carefully on the performance of physi-
cal surveys in determining the priority
dates to be assigned to the several
claims." Significantly, the court de-
clined to extend a 1961 decision which
had permitted work in one drainage
basin to constitute overt activity for an
appropriation in an entirely separate
basin, holding that such separate work
would neither provide notice to others
nor manifest required intent."
These decisions clarify two impor-
tant rules concerning the adequacy of
oven activity. First, such activity need
not include work "on the land." Sec-
ond. the activity must accomplish three
purposes: evidence the applicant's fixed
intent, demonstrate a substantial step
and provide notice to others. Neither
decision provides a clear answer to the
question of whether the notice objec-
tive of overt activity can be fulfilled
merely by filing a water court applica-
tion and by subsequently publishing the
application.
It is logical for the physical actions
necessary to initiate an appropriation
to relate to establishing the bona fides
of intent to divert and use water rather
than to giving notice to others. It is un-
reasonable to assume that even signifi-
cant survey work would serve the tradi-
tional notice objective of coming to the
attention of other water users. Those
users, however, can be notified by the
water court's resume publication if the
project is made the subject of a condi-
tional rights application to establish a
meaningful priority.° Therefore, actual
notice of a conditional claim can be
provided through the resume publica-
tion. The action prong then should be
met if the physical activity evidences
fixed intent and demonstrates the tak-




To preserve a conditional right until
the project is completed, the water
court must determine every four years
that diligence was exercised in develop-
ing the right during the previous four
years.° As with the test for initiation of
rights, the question of diligence in-
volves factual determinations.° The
statutory diligence requirement and
proceedings serve to maximize benefi-
cial use of state waters. As noted by the
Colorado Supreme Court. "(al basic
principle underlying Colorado's water
law is that the most beneficial use is
made of the state's water!'" This policy
underlies diligence determinations.
Diligence is traditionally defined as
"the steady application to business of
any kind, constant effort to accomplish
any undertaking."" Under Colorado
law, a diligence finding requires that
"concrete actions" have been taken in
developing the project and that the ap-
propriator has a continuing intent to
use the water." Thus, the intent and
action requirements for initiating rights
are mirrored in the diligence test.
The decision in Colorado River Wa-
ter Conservation District v. Denver gives
notice of stricter factual requirements
for diligence findings by requiring that
the water court determine whether a
water right is being developed "in the
most expedient and efficient fashion
possible under the circumstances?"
The court affirmed the water court's
cancellation of conditional rights. The
applicant claimed that extensive non-
project activities such as general litiga-
tion, lobbying and political efforts
should establish diligence for several
conditional projects. The court held,
however, that lack of project-specific
work justifies cancellation for lack of
diligence.
The "expedient and efficient/proj-
ect-specific work" test could be signifi-
cant if it is strictly applied by the water
courts. Many conditional projects are
questionably feasible from either
hydrologic or economic standpoints,
and little money is spent for proj-
ect-specific work on those projects. It is
comforting to know that diligence is
determined on the facts presented by
each application, and that traditional
factors concerning financial difficulty,
wars, strikes and other matters beyond
the appropriator's control may excuse
inactivity." The City of Aspen ruling
that work is not required "on the land"
to initiate a conditional right may lead
to the determination that "project-spe-
cific" diligence does not necessarily re-
quire work on the land either.
Filing Requirements
The Colorado Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the statutory requirement for
filing of diligence applications. In Town
of De Beque v. Enewold, the court held
that failure to file timely a diligence ap-
plication results in forfeiture of the con-
ditional priority." The court also held
that omission of a conditional right
from a diligence application and the re-
sulting omission of the right from the
waterjudv's decree does not constitute
clerical error. The court analogized the
diligence statute to a statute of limita-
tions.
Subsequent to the untimely filing of
an application by the Town of De
Beque, legislation was enacted requir-
ing that, before cancelling a conditional
water right, the water court must give
notice to the appropriator." The Town
of De Beque asked that this statute be
applied retroactively to its untimely fil-
ing." Failure of the water clerk to give
the required notice logically would then
excuse a late filing, and the statutory
amendment would have provided a
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safety net. However, the court held that
the statute cannot be applied retroac-
tively to prevent cancellation due to an
untimely filing.
Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v. Highland
Duch ..Issue. also involved a late-filed
diligence application." The Colorado
Supreme Court followed Town of De
Beque and directed cancellation of the
conditional right. Because the applicant
had received a pre-cancellation notice
from the water clerk, the issue of excuse
for failure of such notice was not ad-
dressed. The water court held that
delinquent applicants should be given a
cancellation notice by registered or cer-
tified mail and be permitted to show
cause why the conditional decree
should not be cancelled. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the water
court's ruling was erroneous under the
statute."
At least two questions remain to be
resolved concerning diligence applica-
tion filing requirements. First is a ques-
tion not present in prior cases—Does a
failure to receive the statutory pre-can-
cellation notice excuse a late filing? Sec-
ond is the possibility intimated in
Town of De Beque"—Can circum-
stances beyond the control of an appli-
cant excuse a late filing?
Possible Effect of Others'
Needs on Diligence
The statutes provide that "any per-
son" may file a statement of opposition
to a diligence application," and injury
or water nght ownership are not recog-
nized requirements for such opposition.
The Colorado Supreme Court may
have suggested that competition for wa-
ter could be used in defeating a dili-
gence application. In Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. Denver,
the court stated that the purpose of the
statutory diligence requirement is to:
prevent the accumulation of condi-
tional water rights without diligent
efforts to complete the projects to the
detriment of those needing and seek-
ing to make immediate beneficial use
of the same water." (Emphasis add-
ed)
The emphasized language might sup-
port a novel argument that a diligence
objector can establish that identifiable
water users will be detrimentally pre-
vented from developing water supplies
if diligence is awarded without consid-
eration of the legitimate water needs of
junior appropriators. The rationale is
that such needs should require a higher
standard in determining whether condi-




By statute, water rights, including
conditional water rights, can be
changed in type, place or time of use to
new, alternate or supplemental points
of diversion. They can also be changed
in means of diversion or place of stor-
age. from direct use to storage or from
storage to direct use." Changes must be
permitted if they will not "injuriously
affect the owner of or persons entitled
to use water under a vested water right
or a decreed conditional water right."
Terms and conditions to prevent any
injury may be imposed to allow such
changes."
Changes of absolute water rights are
generally permissible if use under the
decreed change is limited to the prior
historical usage of the water rights as
established by the applicant." In short.
historical use limitations are keys in
changing an absolute water right with-
out injuring other users. In a change of
conditional water rights, however, wa-
ter has not been used, and there is no
historical use on which to base terms
and conditions to prevent injury. As
applications to change conditional
rights have become more numerous,
courts are addressing the standards
which should be imposed in changing
such conditional priorities.
In Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal
Co. v. City of Aspen," the water court
approved a change of conditional rights
from irrigation use to irrigation "and
other uses" based on the 'contemplated
draft" of the project as originally de-
creed. In applying that limitation, the
water court examined the need for wa-
ter for the originally decreed irrigation
use at its originally intended location.°
The Colorado Supreme Court approved
that factual analysis, but did not rule
expressly that "contemplated draft" is
the measure of a changed conditional
water right.
An application filed in Division 5 of
the water court for change of condition-
al rights was granted by the water
judge" and appealed to the Colorado
Supreme Court. The appeal was dis-
missed on stipulation after oral argu-
ment, but the water court's decree is
instructive concerning the application
of the "contemplated draft" analysis.
Objectors urged that permitting re-
strictions which would ha n e limited the
project's water yield as originally de-
creed should limit diversions at new
points of diversion. The water court
rejected these contentions and held that
thc "contemplated draft" of conditional
rights is the amount of water available
in priority at the original points of di-
version or places of storage. The court
reasoned that environmental or regula-
tory permitting restrictions would have
been imposed only to protect environ-
mental values, and the loss to other ap-
propriators of benefits arising from
such permit limitations does not consti-
tute injurious effects to the water rights
of others."
A change of conditional water rights
to new types or places of use could re-
sult in greater consumption of water,
even if a "contemplated draft" limita-
tion precludes enlarged diversions or
storage under the change." The Colora-
do Supreme Court has not addressed
such a problem. and it is an open ques-
tion whether the statutes which now ex-
pressly permit changes of conditional
rights would preclude limitations to
prevent enlarged consumption.
Rules concerning changes of condi-
tional rights are developing so that they
will mirror somewhat the requirements
for changes of absolute rights. Specif-
icity of ultimate water uses and availa-
bility of unappropriated water now are
prerequisites to securing a conditional
decree. Those conditions are analytical-
ly similar to the "historical use" facts
which must support a change of abso-
luterights. While there is obvious merit
in permitting latitude in changing con-
ditional rights, in this author's opinion,
"contemplated consumption" should
become a required element of "contem-
plated draft" for changes of conditional
rights. The measure of an absolute right
in a change proceeding is not merely
the amount and timing of its historical
diversions but, more importantly, the
amount and timing of water consump-
tion and return flows under those di-
versions. Imposing "contemplated con-
sumption" conditions on changes of
conditional rights would preserve to
junior appropriators the maintenance
of stream conditions which existed
when they initiated their rights."
PERFECTION OF
CONDITIONAL RIGHTS
Conversion of a conditional right to
absolute status through judicial deter-
mination of diversion and use of water
"perfects" the appropriation. A decreed
Xetitris of fir phi
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conditional water right can be judicially
converted to "absolute" status to the
extent that water is captured by diver-
sion or storage and beneficially used
within a reasonable period of time.
Mere diversion or storage are inade-
quate for conversion to absolute stat-
us—actual beneficial use of the water
must be demonstrated." Perfection is
significant because it eliminates the
need to show diligence in the future for
the portion of the right which is made
absolute.
Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co. held
that diversions of water at undecreed
points of diversion cannot satisfy the
diversion aspect of convening condi-
tional rights to absolute status." The
court focused on the notice require-
ments of the statutes and the require-
ment that changes of water rights must
be subjected to scrutiny under the
non-injury standard. The case held that
changes in points of diversion for con-
ditional rights must be judicially ap-
proved through a change of water right
proceeding. After approval, diversions
at points not originally decreed will
support conversion of conditional
rights to absolute status.
The Broyles rationale logically ap-
plies to all changes of the type, place or
manner of use of conditional rights.
Therefore, it should be presumed that
use of water diverted under conditional
rights for undecreed purposes will not
establish the beneficial use required for
conversion to absolute status. Any re-
quired changes of use should be ap-
proved by the water court to lay the
foundation for future perfection of con-
ditional rights. This will require more
detailed and long-range planning by de-
velopers of conditional projects. The
ultimate practical goal of such devel-
opers is to perfect the maximum
amount of a conditional water right ex-
peditiously. That goal will be met best
through careful and timely considera-
tion of ultimate diversion points and
water uses.
One significant issue concerning the
perfection of conditional rights that has
not yet reached the Colorado Supreme
Court is whether an applicant for con-
version of a conditional right to abso-
lute status must prove that diversions
or storage were made in priority. In
other words, the applicant may be
called upon to establish that he did not
take someone else's water, regardless of
whether he was advised by state water
administration officials to curtail his
diversions or storage.
By law, an absolute water right can be
decreed to the extent of the proven cap-
ture and beneficial use of water." A
plain reading of the statute indicates
that an applicant for conversion of a
conditional right to absolute status
must prove only capture and use and
not that the water was taken in priority.
This interpretation is supported by
the court's holding in another context
that diversions which technically are
"out-of-priority" can be considered in
establishing historical water use for a
change of water right." A contrary in-
terpretation would create great proof
difficulties for applicants, but would be
consistent with the rule that a condi-
tional decree cannot be entered without
proof of availability of unappropriated
water.
CONCLUSION
There is still a large quantity of un-
developed water in Colorado, but a
good portion is tied up in conditional
decrees. Limited developed supply and
growing demand traditionally reflect
economic conditions favoring a free
market approach to resource develop-
ment. The trend of Colorado's law,
however, may diminish the ability of
private water developers to acquire
conditional priorities. In striving to-
ward maximum utilization, it will
make little difference whether private
or public entities speculate for or hoard
water under conditional decrees. Vigor-
ous application of the speculation doc-
trine ultimately might hinder water de-
velopment unless it is uniformly ap-
plied to all appropriators, including
municipal entities."
Decreed conditional priorities, par-
ticularly those for large projects, in-
crease in value with time. Such rights
can become difficult to cancel simply
because of their age. Moreover, as a de-
cree becomes older, pressure for actual
development should increase. The ap-
parent tightening of requirements for
establishing diligence should begin cull-
ing out some conditional decrees which
have been preserved in the past with
minimal development efforts. Focusing
the diligence test on the existence of
continuing and affirmative intent to de-
velop rights and the performance of
work which actually will result in use of
water is important. Such emphasis may
require water suppliers to make hard
choices as to which conditional rights
should be developed and which should
be allowed to lapse.
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Conditional rights issues remain a
frontier of Colorado water law. The
bedrock principles are fairly clear, but
there are still some uncertainties. Ten-
sion exists between the need for flexi-
bility in developing and perfecting con-
ditional rights and the need for firm
standards for bona fide development
efforts which will result in actual water
use. Development of a consistent doc-
trine will require a continual balancing
of the two competing, yet related de-
ments-certainty of priority and maxi-
mum utilization.
Maximum utilization is the state's ul-
timate goal, while certainty of priority
is the objective of the individual appro-
priator. There is a practical tension and
a constitutional tension between the
two policies.'° The challenge is to
achieve maximum utilization for the
benefit of Colorado and its citizens
without impairing vested rights. In
meeting this challenge, it must be re-
membered, first that the principle un-
derlying conditional water rights, rela-
tion back of priority, is in derogation of
the constitutional appropriation doc-
trine, and, second, that a conditional
right is an inchoate and tenuous right
CONDITIONAL WATER RIGHTS LAW
which is not "vested" in the sense that
an absolute right is vested.
NOTES
I. Significant questions also presently ex-
ist concerning the applicability of condition-
al rights law and the priority system to rights
to use nontributary groundwater located
outside the boundaries of designated
groundwater basins. See Phillips, "Non-
tributary Groundwater: The Continuing
Saga," 13 The Colorado Lawyer 68 (Jan.
1984). The law in this area is sufficiently
unique and in flux that it may be premature
to address these questions. The Ground-
water Legislation Committee issued a repon
on August 1, 1984, concerning potential
legislative modifications affecting the ac-
quisition, development and administration
of such rights These matters are the subject
of legislation pending before the Colorado
General Assembly as of the date of this
writing. See, S.B. 5, 55th General Assembly,
1st Reg. Sess.
2.CRS § 37-92-103(6). See also, I Hut-
chins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen
Western States 583-84 (1971).
3.CRS § 37-92-305(1). See, Harvey Land
& Cattle Co. v. Southeastern Colorado Wa-
ter Conservancy Dist., 631 P.2d 1111, 1113
(Colo. 1981).
4. See. Denver v Northern Colorado Wa-
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40. See. CRS § 37-92-302(3). Also, in
1981. the Colorado General Assembly
enacted CRS § 37-92-306.1, which permits
water users to relate water right applications
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ver, 511 P.2d 25.28 (Colo. 1973).
46.Supra. note 6 at 1142.
47. Id. at 1141-42, citing. Colorado River
N 'arty Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes
Reservoir if Canal Ca, 468 P.2d 853, 856
(Colo. 1970).
48.606 P.2d 48, 53 (Cola 1980); see also,
Simineo it Belling, 607 P.2d 1289 (Colo.
1980).
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P.2d 1367, 1371 (Cob. 1980); Farmers
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634 (Cob. 1954).
59.568 P.2d 45 (Cola 1977).
60.1d. at 49.
61. Application of Gulf Oil Corp., Case
No. W-2686, District Court for Water Divi-
sion No. 5 (April 30, 1975).
62.Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment and Decree, Case No.
W-2686, District Court for Water Division
No. 5 (December 5, 1979) at 17-18, 22-23.
63.1n Twin Lakes, both the water court
and Colorado Supreme Court dismissed an
"enlarged consumption" objection because
under both the original decree and the
change of use all water would be diverted
transmountain from the Roaring Fork River
basin to an entirely separate basin. the
Arkansas River. Thus, the diversion would
constitute a 100 percent depletion to the
Roaring Fork River. regardless of the nature
of ultimate water use. Twin LaAes. supra.
note 59 at 50. See also in this regard. CRS §
37-82-106. concerning rights to use "im-
ported" or "foreign" waters.
64. Colorado law has long provided that
appropriators secure a vested right in the
maintenance of stream conditions in exis-
tence at the time their appropriations were
made. See. e.g., Wilbert, supra. note 58 at
1371-72.
65. See, Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. White
River Elec. Assn. 376 P.2d 158, 161 (Colo.
1962): compare, CRS § 37-92-305(9ga) with
-305(9)(b).
66.638 P.2d 244, 250-51 (('olo. 1981).
67. CRS § 37-92-305(9ga).
68. See, Southeastern Colorado Hater
Conservancy District v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977,
982 (Cola 1981). Compare. Cache La
Poudre Hater Users Ass 'n v. Glacier new
Meadows. 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976)
(senior users cannot show injury and they
cannot prevent beneficial use of water by
others).
69. The same diligence standard applies to
all appropriators, and municipal corpora-
tions have no special status under Colorado
water law. See. Denver, supra. note 4 at
999.
70. The Colorado Supreme Court has not-
ed:
It is implicit in these constitutional provi-
sions [concerning the appropriation doc-
trine] that along with vested rights, there
shall be maximum will:anon of the water
of this state. As administration of water
approaches its second century the curtain
is opening upon the new drama of
maximum Wilt:anon and how constitu-
tionally that doctrine can be integrated
into the law of vested rights.
Fellhauer v. People. 447 P.2d 986. 994
(Cola 1968) (emphasis in original).
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COLORADO RIVER WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT
DISTRICT COURT, WATER DIVISION NO. 5, STATE OF COLORADO
Action No. 84 CW 70
ORDER
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF:
THE COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, THE BASALT
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, THE WEST DIVIDE WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, THE MIDDLE PARK WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, AND THE
WATER USERS ASSOCIATION NO. 1 IN THE COLORADO RIVER WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT, in Grand, Routt, Moffat, Eagle, Pitkin,
Rio Blanco, Garfield, Mesa, and Gunnison Counties, Colorado.
This matter came before the Court on the Applicant's Motion
in Limine filed on February 24, 1986.
This is an application for a finding of quadrennial diligence.
The Applicant requests an order determining that the rule in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Water Co.,
197 Colo. 413, 594 P24 566 (1979) is not applicable to diligence
proceedings. The rule in Ifidler to which the District refers
requires that to establish intent to appropriate water an applicant
for a conditiohal water right must show that it has plans to put
the water to use itself or that it has firm contractual commitments
to supply watertraiir. crisi riCan agency relationship Witti-Such.
usC
The Applicant argues that the only issue before the Court in
a diligence proceeding is whether the applicant hai proceeded with




To prove due diligence there must be shown an intention to
use the water, coupled with concrete action amounting to diligent
efforts to finalize the intended appropriation. Orchard Mesa 
Irrigation District v. City and County of Denver, 182 Colo. 59,
511 P2d 25 (1973). The rule in Vidler forms a part of the definition
of intent.
The Applicant argues that the existence of intent was determined
at the hearing on the application for a conditional decree and that
a re-examination of that issue in a diligence proceeding would render
meaningless the doctrine of res judicata. In ruling that intent
is an issue in a diligence proceeding, the Court is not re-examining
an issue already determined at the conditional decree hearing. The
issue decided at the conditional decree hearing was whether, at that
time, the applicant had the necessary intent to appropriate water.
The issue to be examined in a diligence hearing is whether the intent
to appropriate water has continued to exist during the diligence
period. Intent is not a static condition but is subject to change.
For instance, in the context of Vidler, the applicant may at the
time of the conditional decree hearing have intended to use the water
itself, but may no longer so intend during the diligence period.
It Is Therefore Ordered that the issue of the continued
existence during the relevant diligence period of the intent to
appropriate water is relevant to diligence proceedings and that the
rule stated in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler 
Water Co., 197 Colo. 413, 594 P2d 566 (1979) is applicable thereto.
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DISTRICT COURT, WATER DIVISION NO. 5, STATE OF COLORADO
Action No. 84 CW 70
ORDER
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF:
THE COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, THE BASALT
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, THE WEST DIVIDE WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, THE MIDDLE PARR WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, AND THE
WATER USERS ASSOCIATION NO. 1 IN THE COLORADO RIVER WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICT, in Grand, Routt, Moffat, Eagle, Pitkin,
Rio Blanco, Garfield, Mesa, and Gunnison Counties, Colorado.
This matter came before the Court on the Applicant's Second
Motion in Limine filed on May 5, 1986.
This is-an application for a finding of quadrennial diligence.
The Applicant requests an order determining that C.R.S. 37-92-305(9)(b)
has no application to a diligence proceeding.
That statute provides:
"No claim for a conditional water right may be recognized
or a decree therefore granted except to the extent that
it is established that the water can be and will be
diverted, stored,-or otherwise captured, possessed and
controlled and will be beneficially used and that the
project can and will be completed with diligence and
within a reasonable time."
The Applicant argues that the Colorado Supreme Court in
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. City of Florence,
688 P2d 715 (Colo. 1984) determined that C.R.S. 37-92-305(9)(b)
applies only to proceedings on an application for a conditional
BY THE COURT:
GAV D. LIT LLER,
Judge




decree. Southeastern cannot be so construed. The proceedings
there were on an application for a conditional decree. The Court
did rule that the requirements of the statute must be met before
the entry of a conditional decree. It did not rule that that was
the only circumstance in which the statute was applicable.
The statute itself provides that no conditional water right
may be recognized unlessAe statutory requirements have been met.
Diligence proceedings involve the recognition of a conditional
water right.
To the extent that the statute was not plead in the statement
of opposition, one of the purposes of the pretrial conference is to
determine if the pleadings must be amended. To the extent that the
statute was not plead in the statement of opposition, it will be
deemed to have been amended by the pretrial order.
It is Therefore Ordered That C.R.S. 37-92-305(9)(b) is
applicable to quadrennial proceedings.
Dated: July 17, 1986.
Copy of the tormplISo mutant to all
Counsel of rocordaatese
Rsforoo—Div. Ewintiorand..,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR





IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
FOR WATER RIGHTS OF
GULF OIL CORPORATION, STANDARD OIL 	 ) FINDINGS OF FACT,
COMPANY (INDIANA) AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
POWER CO.	 ) AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE
IN THE WHITE RIVER BASIN
IN RIO BLANCO AND GARFIELD COUNTIES, )
COLORADO.
These proceedings were initiated by the filing of an
Application for Change of Water Rights on April 30, 1975, by
the Applicants Gulf Oil Corporation and Standard Oil Company
of Indiana (hereiaafter referred to, collectively, as "Gulf-
Standard") and Rocky Mountain Power Co. (hereinafter referred to
as "Rompoco"). Notice of the Application was duly published
in the resume of the Water Clerk in the month of May, 1975..	 ,
502	 Timely Statements of Opposition were filed in these oroteedinns
by Objectors Colorado River Water Conservation District, The
Superior Oil Company and Union Oil Company of California. Union
Oil Company withdrew its Statement of Opposition by motion
filed herein on August 8, 1975.
A stipulation (hereinafter referred to as the
"Stipulation") was negotiated and entered into between the
Applicants and the remaining Objectors who had filed Statements
of Opposition, specifying terms, conditions and restrictions
for protection of the rights of tha Objectors and agreeing to
join in the request for entry of a decree in these proceedings
503
embodying such terms, conditions and restrictions. The Stipulation





the Northw.est corner of Section 15, Township 3 South, Range 87
West of the 5th P.M. bears South 86°24' East 66,364 feet.
(The above water rights are hereinafter referred to as the
"Subject water Rights".)
2. The Subject Water Rights (together with other
water rights not involved in this proceeding) comprise the
"Sweetwater Hydroelectric Project No. 482" as designated in
—tiCnad Decree. Under the Sweetwater Hydroelectric
Project, Rompoco planned to divert and to store waters derived
from the Subject Water Rights, and than conduct such waters 	 -
through the divide which separates the South Fork of the White
River drainage basin front the Sweetuater Creek drainage basin.
The South Fork drainage basin drains into, and is tributary to,
the White River which flows from the State of Colorado into
Utah and thence into the Green River. Tha Sweetwater Creek
drainage basin drains into, and is tributary to, the Colorado
.
River which flous in a westerly direction and departs from
the State of Colorado. The Colorado River drainage basin
in Colorado is separated from the White River drainage basin
by a divide. Accordingly, under the Sweetwater Hydroelectric
Project, a transbasin diversion was planned whereunder waters
diverted and utilized under the Subject Water Rights would be
entirely diverted from the basin of origin of such waters
(the White River Basil) and no return flow therefrom would
return to such basin within the State of Colorado.
1.
3. Since the date of the award of the Subject Water
1524 1. The evidece indicated that the Sweetwater Hydroelectric .
Project contemplated regulation of the penstock pressure system
such that waters could be made to flow from the Sweetwater side
through the Plateau Tunnel to the South Fork side. The evidence
establishes, however, that in the event of such use the water
so transported would be temporarily impounded in the Meadows
Reservoir and then reconducted through the Plateau Tunnel to be
discharged through the planned hydroelectric plants situated on
the Sweetwater side o F the drainage divide. Hence, as planned,
ultimately all waters diverted for use from the South Fork drainage
would be utilized in the Sweetwater (Colorado) drainage basknnand




Rights, Applicants have made applications for findings of
reasonable diligence within the times and in the manner
required by applicable statutes, and Orders and Findings
of Diligence have been entered with respect to each such
application. The Court finds that the Subject Water Rights
have not been abandoned and are in force and effect.
4. Dry Creek argues that the Subject Water Rights
should never have been granted or should now be cancelled
for failure to exercise due diligence in their development.
These arguments are not well-taken for several reasons. The
original decree is res adjudicate with respect to the validity
of the water right; decreed therein. See Boulder and Weld 
County Ditch Co. v. Lower Boulder Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 115,
43 P. 540 (1396); Reagle v. Square S. Land and Cattle Co.,
133 Colo. 392, 296 P.24 235 (1955); City of Grand Junction v. 
Kannah Creek Water Users Ass'n., 192 Colo. 279, 557 P.2d 1169
(1976); Green';. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775
(1962). The speculation issue urged by Dry Creek waS specifically
raised by an objector and implicitly resolved by the District
Court's decree adjudicating the Subject .Water Rights. That
decree was affirmed on appeal. Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d
433 (1971), cert. den. 405 U.S. 996 (1972). With respect
to due diligence, Dry Creek is bound by the series of decrees
obtained in proceedings conducted pursuant to statute in which
it has been found that Applicants and their predecessors in
interest have exercised due diligence in development of
the Subject Water Rights. .See Reagle v. Scuare S. Land 
and Cattle Co., supra; Otto Lumber Co. v. Water Supply and




of these decrees was issued July 28, 1977, approving and
confirming a Ruling of Referee in W-719-76 based on an
application filed May 28, 1976. By tin terms of that decree
tne next application for quadrennial finding of reasonable
diligence is to be filed in May of 1930. The statutes
contain no requirement that a demonstration of reasonable
diligence be made as part of a change of water right proceeding.
The pre-trial order does not list this as an issue. Finally,
the record in this proceeding amply demonstrates reasonable
diligence to maintain the Subject Water Rights in effect
and to proceed toward development thereof by extensive
and diligent efforts to obtain changes in water rights
necessary to permit development to occur after the original
plan was impaired by inclusion of part of the Meadows
Reservoir site and the point of diversion of Patterson
Creek Diversion Pipe within the Flat Tops Wilderness
by Congressional action on December 12, 1975.
5. On December 12, 1975, subsequent to the 'instftution
-9a-
of these proceedings, Public La:, 94-146 was enacted by
7 3 0
	
the united States Congress which designated curtain lands
in Rio Blanco County for inclusion within the Flat Tops
Wilderness. The designation of areas to be included was
made under the National Wilderness Preservation System Act,
16 U.S.C. 1132 et seq. The point of diversion of 'ale of
the Subject Water Rights as originally decreed (the Patterson
Creek Diversion Pipe) lies within the area designated to be
included within the Flat Tops Wilderness Area as do portions
of the land which would be inundated by the Meadows Reservoir.
6. Dry Creek argues that once development of
facilities to permit diversions pursuant to a water right
have been precluded because facility locations are included
within a wilderness area the water right is effectively
extinguished. It would then follow that no change of water
0.1 i5 3 	 right application to remove the facility locations from
the wildernesO area could be entertained. Dry Creek's argument
is unpersuasive. A conditional water right constitutes a vested
property right. Mooney V. Kuioer, 194 Colo. 477, 573 P.2d 533
(1973). One incident of that right is the right to change of
point of diversion, change of use, or both, if no injury is
caused to others. c.n.s. (1973) 37-92-103(5); 37-92-305(3);
City of Colorado Sorines v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151
(1952) 1: If Dry Creek's contention Were correct, the wilderness
legislation would effect a taking of conditional water rights
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Article II, section 15 of the Constitution of the State of
Colorado. No such intent can be imputed to Congress. See
• n•
Ex Porte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Congress carefully
preserved, or provided compensation for the taki .lg of, property
*This case involves change of point of diversion only.
-10-
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rights of other kinds incident to creation of wilderness
areas. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133 (c), 1134. Provision is made for
establishment and maintenance within a wilderness area of
"reservoirs, water-conservatioa works, public projects
and other facilities needed in the public interest,"with
Presidential approval and Upon his determination that
such use or uses in the specific area Will better serve the
•
interests of the United States and the people thereof than
will its denial;...." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(d)(4). if-there:is
any ambiguity, the limited legislative history on this point
indicates that it was assumed to be clear that Colorado law
would permit changes of points of diversion to move points
of diversion encompassed within the Flat Tops Wilderness
Area to new locations outside the wilderness boundaries.
See Dry Creek Exhibits 1 and 2, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on the Environment and Land Resources of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs United States Senate, especially
1534_the comments of Senator Haskell at pages 382-383 oflichibit 1, .
and Exhibit T at pages 7-8. The Court concludes that the
inclusion of the point of diversion of Patterson Creek Diversion
Pipe and portions of land to be encompassed within Meadows
	 -
Reservait7. 777rEffin Flat Tops Wilderness does not prevent the
change of point of diversion of the aforementioned rights
as sought in these proceedings.
7. On January 8, 1974, Applicants Gulf-Standard,
as the successful bidders therefor, were awarded an oil shale
lease by the United States of America, pursuant to the Federal
533	 Prototype Oil Shale Leasing Program. The said oil shale lease
covers lands designated as "Tract c-a" in Rio Blanco County,
Colorado, situated in parts of Towns ip 1 South and Township 2





8. The Applicants, Gulf-Standard, after the
acquisition of the Tract C-a Lease commenced exploration and
development operations on and in connection with such Tract
under the name of "Rio Blanco Oil Shale Project"; Subsequently, -
the parties (Culf and Standard) formed a general partnership
for the development and mining of Trect . C-a under the name of
"Rio Blanco Oil Shale Company" Which will hereinafter be
referred to as "Rio Blanco." Rio Blanco has expended more
than $200,000,000 in connection with the Tract C-a Project.
Tract C-a was denominated as a tract particularly amenable
to development through open-pit mining methods. At present
Rio Blanco plans that initial experimental development will
take place over some four years and will be through a
modified in situ extraction method.
9. Upon being awarded the lease on Tract C-a,
Applicants Gulf-Standard commenced studies of water supply
systems tomcat the requirements of the oil shale project.
The said Applicants submitted applications to this Court for
water rights in connection with the "Yellow Creek Reservoir"
situated on Yellow Creek, a tributary of the White River, at
a distance of approximately four miles upstream from the point
that Yellow Creak discharges into the White River.
2.
 The
location of the dam of the Yellow Creek Reservoir is determined
by a line extending along the anis of the dam, which line begins
at a point on the right (North) abutment thereof located
19,909 feet North 31°42' West of the Southeast corner of
Section 1, Township 1 North, Range 98 West, 6th P.M.; thence
bearing South 18°00' West a distance of 2,200 feet.
2. The case designations of applications for water rights
with respect to the Yellow Creek Reservoir in this Court arc






10. Shortly after the award of thu Tract C-a Lease,
Gulf-Standard commenced investigations of the available
water rights which might be acquired by purchase to supply
a dependable source for the water requirements of the company's
project. Negotiations ware commenced in early 1974 by
Gulf-Standard with Rompoco seeking to obtain the right to
acquire the Subject Water Rights. These negotiations culminated
in the execution of a contract on April 15, 1975,  providing
for the acquisition of the Subject Water Rights by Gulf-Standard.
In accordance with the provisions of the said co..tract,
these proceedings were instituted seeking the change of the
Subject Water Rights, on an alternative basis, from the
points of diversion, character of use and type of decrees
specified in the original decrees for said rights, in order
that said rights may be diverted at the new point of diversion
from the White River, designated below, transported therefrom
to the Yellow Creek Reservoir for impoundment therein, and/or
.4*
transporcad to the vicinity of Tract C-a to be utilized,
either by direct flow application or by storage, and thereafter
application for mining, industrial, refining, retorting, power,
domestic, irrigation, fish and wildlife propagation and
recreational uses. In its Application, Applicants propose
that a portion of the said waters derived from the subject
water rights may be allocated by Applicants, Gulf-Standard,
to existing or proposed municipalities or housing developments
in the general region in which Tract C-a is situated to
supply the increased municipal and domestic water needs
properly attributable to Rio Rlanco's developments and
activities incident thereto. In addition, the Application
proposes that portions of said waters may be utilized in




Gulf-Standard, approval of which is sought in the said Case
W-2514, or for the purposes of exchange of use with other
water rights as permitted by applicable law.
11. Applicants, Gulf-Standard, seek as an
alternative to the points of diversion specified in the
decrees for the Subject Water Rights, the right to divert
the water represented thereby from the White River at .a
point below the Town of Meeker, Colorado, described as follows:
The intersection of the axis of
the diversion dam (which is coincident
with the center line of the diversion
conduit) with the left (South) bank
of the White River is situated at a
point whence the Northwest Corner of
Section 13, Township 2 North, Range 98
West, 6th Principal Meridian, bears
North 81 0 09' West a distance of 3,903 feet.
12. Applicants, Gulf-Standard, propose to construct
a concrete overflow diversion structure, together with earthen
dike extensions across the White River, or other appropriate
543	 diversion works, at the point designated in Paragraph 11 above,
incorporating an intake and pumping_plant_of sufficient
capacity to divert the water attributable to the Subject
Water Rights into a pipeline, tunnel and related works to
convey such water, either directly to the point of use in
the vicinity of Tract C-a, or for storage in the Yellow
Creek Reservoir, and retention therein for later conveyance
through conduits and pumping stations to the points of use.
13. By utilization of the Subject Water Rights
by Rio Blanco as sought in these change proceedings,. therwaters
attributable to such rights would be permitted to flow,
154,1
	 unimpeded, from the location of the original points of
diversion or impoundment along the natural course of the
South Fork of the White River thence down the White River to




such waters would be collected in the forebay to be created
by tha structure CIVET-Med in Paragraph 12 above, situated
on the White River below the Town of Meeker at a point
approximately 87_stream miles below the original paints
of diversion.
14. Dry Creek is the owner of the following vested
water rights:
Adjudication 'Appronriation
Structure Amount Dare Date
























Blair Ditch 2.40 cfs
absolute
03/24/29 04/15/1383




























Raley Reservoir 23,649 AF
cond.
11/06/72 04/03/70
Henry Reservoir 37,116 AF
cond.
11/03/72 04/03/70
The points of diversion of some or all of these rights are




points of diversion of the Subject Water Rights and the
proposed alternate point of diversion of the Subject Water
1543	 Rights. The Court takes judicial notice that the records of
the water court reflect the enistence of numerous other
solute and conditional water rights, some senior and some
junior to the Subject Water Rights, having points of diversion
at various locations on the White River and its tributaries
below the original points of diversion of the Subject Water
Rights.
. 15. Fundamental questions of policy inhere in a
decision whether conditional water rights should be subject
to changes of points of diversion and of use. A conditional
water right which might be uneconomical to develop at its
original location might become economically attractive at
a new point of diversion or for application to a different
. . beneficial use. Thus, a change of such a conditional water
1540 1	 _ 1
right might result in development of a  project which would
i t
never have burdened the stream were the change not permitted.	 I
' Major projects founded upon conditional water rights frequently
change substantially in scope and features as progressively
more refined engineering studies advance such projects from
initial conception to completion. The changes may result in 
differences in the draft on the stream. Thus, until a con-
ditional water right becomes absolute by application of
water to beneficial use the draft on the stream cannot be
known with certainty. The legislature undoubtedly was mindful
1550
L
of these and other problems incident to changes of conditional
water rights when it resolved the fundamental policy questions
in favor of permitting changes of conditional water rights.
C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-103(5); C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-305(3).






right presents for judicial consideration is whether the
change will "injuriously affect the owner of or persons
entitled to use water under a vested water right or decreed
conditional water right," C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-305(3).
If it will not, the change of water right "shall be approved." Id.
16. In the case of change of point of diversion
J-
of an absolute water right, ltation of the quantity to
be diverted at the new location to the amount historically
diverted at the original point of diversion provides one
reliable criterion to prevent injury to other water rights, and
such criterion has been adopted. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co.,
150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962). In the case of a conditional
water right the amount to be diverted at the original point
of diversion is inherently uncertain. The project when built
might divert less than the quantity conditionally decreed;
indeed, the project might never be built at all. Asa result,
— I
an applicant for change of conditional water right caffnot
establish with certainty what the draft on the stream would
have been had the project gone forward in the logical
development of its original conception. To hold that for
such reason an applicant for change of point of diversion
could not carry his burden of proof to show absence of injury
to other water rights would utterly defeat the legislative
purpose to allow such changes. C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-103(5).
The task for the Court is to adopt a construction which will
implement the purpose of the legislaturel • The direction to
be taken has already been indicated. In Twin lakes Reservoir
and Canal Co. v. CitV of Asnen, 193 Colo. 478, 563 P.2d 45 (1977)
("Twin lakes") it was recognized if not held that the appropriate
measure of the water divertible at a changed or alternate
point of diversion of a conditional water right is the draft
3. Mooney v. Xutoer, su pra; Frehlick Crane Service, Inc. V. 
Mack, 162 Colo. 34, ail) 7.2d J4 (1V73). 	 ry.
i
the sources of supply of the Subject Water  Rights was all 	 I
i
waters available, in priority, to such rights at the respectiv
points of diversion originally decreed in the_adjudication
proceeding, which the claimant anticipated_to-average-106,295
\
iacre feet per year, in the aggtegate,_ftom_all-of-the_marces
1
of supply, being composed of 77,395 acr-. 5 et from the South
[553	 Fork of thu White River and its tributaries-ebove-Meadows-Dam,,
12,010 acre feet from Wagon Wheel Creek and 16,900 acre feet
o7t the stream contemplated at the time of the original
appropriation (the "Contemplated Draft"). In Twin Lakes 
--------------------
the Contemplated Draft was established by the needs of the
project lands upon which the water was to be applied to
beneficial us. In the present case, the Contemplated
-
Draft was for the principal, or first in time, beneficial .
use of power generation. The initial and continuing need for
the power cannot be demonstrated with the certainty that
applied to proof of initial and continuing needs of the
project lands in Twin latces. Indeed, if the changes of
water rights are granted no_power_will_be generated. To
hold that such indefiniteness disables Rompeco from carrying
its burden of proof to show absence of injury to other water
rights would effectively prohibit change of water rights with
respect to the Subject Water Rights and other conditional
water rights of similar character. Such could not have
been the legislative intent. The contemplated power generation
/
support the adjudication of the Subject Water Rights. The
Contemplated Draft for purpose of the change of water rights
proceeding must be concluded to be determined based on the I
original contemplated power generation.









from Patterson Creek. This is supported by the record in
the original adjudication proceedings and the testimony
of witnesses Fleming, Van Sickle and Witaschek in this
proceeding.
13. In accordance with the Stipulation entered inn
between Applicants and the Colorado Paver Water Conservatict
District and The Superior Oil Company, Applicants Gulf-
Standard are required to maintain a system of gaging station
to measure the flow at the original points of diversion frct
which the water officials shall calculate the water which ec-
he diverted or otherwise utilized at the proposed new point
of diversion after deduction of by-passes required to meet
the demands of senior appropriators under the priority systa.
after deduction of amounts to compensate for transportation
losses between the decreed points and the new point of
diversion and, after employment of a time delay factor to
reflect the period of time required for waters measured at
the original points of diversion to reach the new point of
diversion.
19. The Stipulation contains the following provisirn
with respect to losses incurred in transporting waters from
the original points of diversion to the new point sought in
these proceedings:
"As shown in EXhibit B hereto, the current estimati
of maximum stream losses in transportation of said
water is Five percent (5%) based upon the approxim==
—
criteria utilized by the State Engineer of the
1555	 State of Colorado. Engineering studies are current-
in progress, however, by Applicants to more accuraLL7
determine the stream losses for the specific reacht_
of the stream pertainins to the change of point of
-19-
diversion sough: h .,!rein, and the factor
to be applied for reduction of water
	
it)	
available for diversion at the new point of
di”ersion shall be the actual losses as
demonstrated by the engineering data developed by
said studies."
The Court finds that the evidence introduced in these
proceedings establishes the reasonableness of the estimates
of transportation losses which were derived from studies made
pursuant to the Stipulation, being in the amounts of 57. .
transportation loss in July, August and September and 2.57. loss
for months from October through June.
20. The Court finds from the evidence introduced in
these proceedings, which finding is supported by the evidence
and testimony entered in the adjudication proceedings in
	
56i	
which the Subject Water Rights were decreed, that the components
of the Sweetwater Hydroelectric Project were designed in such
manner that water lost by system inefficiencies (i.e.? the
annual average amount of water that would percolate through
or under the storage dams, diversion dams, canals, or other
structures or facilities) would aggregate not more than
three-tenths of a percent (0.37,) of the average annual
yield projected for the Subject Water Rights. There was no
showing that the timing of such losses or any part thereof
	
562
	 would have made the water so lost available for diversion
based on water rights having points of diversion downstream
from the Sweetwater Hydroelectric Project at times when
such diversions would occur.
21. Due notice of these proceedings has been given
as required by law and the Court has jurisdiction over the




22. As specified in the Stipulation, Applicants
have caused a gaging system to be installed to measure flows
Iron the various sources of-supply of the Subject Water Rights
at or near the various original points of diversion of such
rights. Attached hereto as Attachment A is a map portraying
the gaging system so installed by Applicants. Cage numbered 3
situated in Patterson Creek as shown on Attachment A was
located within the boundaries of the Flat Tops Wilderness
Area and was required to be removed on October 7, 1977.
Pursuant to the Stipulation, Applicants have conducted studies
in order to correlate by statistical analysis flows on Patterson
Creek at the original point of diversion of the Patterson
Creek Diversion Pipe with the readings of gage numbered 4
(as portrayed on Attachment A) which measures flows on the
South Fork of the White River immediately outside of the
Flat Tops Wilderness boundary. Frcm such studies Applicants
have developed n correlation curve which is attached hereto
as Attachment B which gives an equivalent relationship between
the flows measured at gage numbered 4 and at the original point
of diversion of the Patterson Creek Diversion Pipe. The
utilization of correlation by statistical analysis is a
recognized method frequently utilized for water measurement
purposes; in this case, the method adequately reflects the
flow at the original point of diversion of the Patterson
Creek Diversion Pipe.
23. Dry Creek has proposed certain terms and conditions
to prevent the proposed changes of water rights from injuriously
affecting the owner.of or persons entitled to use water under
a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right,
pursuant to C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-305. Except as those
proposed terms and conditions are incorporated in this decree
-21-
	 576
it is found and concluded that they are unnecessary for such
purpose. The more significant of Dry Creek's proposed
terms and conditions are discussed in the following subparagraphs.
a. Dry Creek urges that diversions at the alternate
point of diversion must be limited to those which would have
occurred had the project upon which the Subject Water Rights
are based been constructed as planned, citing Twin Lakes.
Dry Creek contends that minimum stream flow conditions,
maximum reservoir fluctuation conditions, maximum rate of




imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to protect
fishlife in the stream and other environmental values. On
the basis of the evidence, this appears to be correct. Dry
Creek then contends that such conditions must be imposed at
the alternate point of diversion to satisfy the Contemplated
Draft criterion of Twin Lakes. No case has been found which
5
addresses this precise question. However, any such conditions
would have been imposed for the protection of environmental
and recreational values such as maintenance Of fishlife. To
impose such conditions on diversions at the alternate point
of diversion is entirely unnecessary to the intended purpose, for
when the alternate point of diversion is being utilized the entire
flow which could have been diverted in priority at the original
points of diversion based upon tha Subject Water Rights remains in
the stream until it reaches the alternate point of diversion
some 87 miles downstream. Any benefit accruing to junior
appropriators through imposition of those conditions is






possible benefit is concluded not to constitute an injurious
effect to decreed conditional water rights within the meaning
of C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-305(3). As Applicants note, the evidence
establishes the likelihood that construction of the diversion
structure at the alternate point of diversion will be subject
to conditions imposed by the federal agencies from which permits
for such construction must be obtained. To impose additional
conditions on diversion based upon conditions which would
, have been imposed had the original project been constructed
mould subject the Subject Water Rights to a double burden
completely unnecessary to accomplish the purpose for which
the conditions relating to the original project would have
been imposed. It is concluded that conditions which would
have been imposed had the project upon which the Subject
Water Rights are based been constructed as originally planned
need not be imposed on diversions at the alternate point of
diversion in order to meet the standard of Min Lakes or for
any other reason.
b. Dry Creek urges that conditions would occur from
time to time which would have required that water divertible
in priority pursuant to the Subject Water Rights be passed
down the South Fork of the White River because the capacity
of the components of the Sweetwater Hydroelectric Project
would have been insufficient to permit the water to be
applied directly to beneficial Use or stored. The evidence
does not support that contention. The record upon the basis
of which the Subject Water Rights were initially decreed in
Civil Action No. 1269 in Rio Blanco County District Court,
and the testimony of Messrs. Fleming, Van Sickle and Witaschek
in this proceeding for change of water rights are adequate to
establish a prima facie case that Rompoco designed the
57a
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components of the Sweetwater Hydroelectric Project in order
to_eltutilize all waters available to the Subject
Water Rinhts in priority. It is found that no spillage or
foregone diversions would have taken place had the project
been constructed as contemplated at the time of the original
decrees. Therefore it is unnecessary to limit diversions
based upon the Subject Water Rights to reflect any spillage
or foregone diversions resulting from lack of capacity of the
project facilities to accommodate all water divertible in
priority.
24. The Court finds and concludes from the evidence
introduced that the limitations, terms and ccnditions specified
in the Stipulation which are hereinafter incorporated into
this Decree, together with the other limitations, terms and
conditions specified in this Decree will prevent the change
of water rights sought by Applicants from injuriously affecting
the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested
water rights or a decreed conditional water right, within the
meaning of C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-305(3).
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
IT IS HEREDY ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT a change of
:cr rights of the Subject Water Rights to establish an
Cite point of diversion is hereby granted and decreed
'ollows:
1. The Subject Water Rights may be diverted from
'lite River at an alternate point of diversion at the
• Creek Dam Diversion and Pumping Works which will be
!LI such that the intersection of the axis of the
ln dam (which will be coincident with the center line
iversion conduit) with the left (South) bank of the




water judge on the question of injury to the vested rights of
Ci9G	 others for a period of two years from the date hereof, subject
to further extension upon further order of the water judge,
all pursuant to C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-304(6), as amended.
It is further ordered that a copy of this Judgment
and Decree shall be filed with the State Engineer and the
Division Engineer as provided by C.R.S. (1973) 37-92-304(8).
In view of anticipated delay in mailing copies of
this Judgment and Decree to interested parties,on the Court's
own motion, it is further ordered that the time for filing
motions directed hereto is extended to and including January 15,
1930.
/-
Done this 	  day of  7.27-czn-ra.tv-  , 1979.
oi;
GEO2CE L. Loan,
Water Judge
58;
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